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ABSTRACT
The advent of the digital era and the global market pose unique
challenges to intellectual property law. To adapt, U.S. patent laws
require constant interpretation in the face of rapidly changing
technological advances. In AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., the
Federal Circuit interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) in a technologydependent manner in order to effectuate the purpose of the law with
respect to global software distribution. However, the Federal
Circuit failed to consider the presumption against extraterritorial
application of U.S. law, and its decision now risks international
discord and harm not only to the American software industry, but
other U.S. industries as well. This iBrief critiques the lower court
decisions in AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. in light of the
presumption against extraterritoriality, and analyzes how the
Supreme Court should apply the presumption in its review of the
case.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
The requirements for establishing infringement of a U.S. patent are
stated in § 271 of the United States Patent Act. 2 While § 271(a) establishes
the basis for patent infringement within the United States, § 271(f) sets out
the conditions for liability where inventions patented in the United States
are exported. 3 The broad language of the provision raises several questions
1
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2
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
3
Id. § 271(a), (f). Section 271(f) states:
(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied
in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the
components of a patented invention, where such components are
uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively
induce the combination of such components outside of the
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that courts have attempted to clarify in the twenty years since § 271(f)’s
enactment. 4 Some issues courts have wrestled with include determining the
scope of “component,” the nature of conduct that constitutes “supplying”
from the United States, and whether liability under § 271(f) attaches
differently depending on the technological nature of the patent. 5 In
attempting to resolve these issues, the Federal Circuit, in its recent decision
in AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 6 expanded the scope of § 271(f) by
interpreting the provision to have extraterritorial effects. The Federal
Circuit’s expansive interpretation of § 271(f) risks disrupting the well-being
of the U.S. software industry and, more significantly, the role the United
States plays in the international scheme of intellectual property
enforcement.
¶2
This iBrief addresses the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 271(f)
in AT&T v. Microsoft, where it held: (1) that for the purposes of § 271(f),
software code could be a component of a patented invention, and (2) that
liability for infringement attaches to copies of such software made abroad
and used in a manner that would infringe on a patented invention if the
conduct occurred in the United States. 7 Part I summarizes the enactment
and subsequent judicial interpretation of § 271(f), describing the Federal
Circuit’s recent trend of interpreting the statute broadly. Part II outlines the
facts, procedural history and lower court decision in AT&T v. Microsoft and
the arguments presented by the parties before the Supreme Court. Part III
expands on the principles of comity and national treatment underlying the

United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such
combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as
an infringer.
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied
in or from the United States any component of a patented
invention that is especially made or especially adapted for use in
the invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component
is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component
is so made or adapted and intending that such component will be
combined outside of the United States in a manner that would
infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the
United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
Id. (emphasis added).
4
Alex Cartove, Activities that Occur Outside the U.S. May Result in Liability for
Infringement of a U.S. Patent: AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp, 414 F.3d 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2005), MORRISON FOERSTER, LEGAL UPDATES & NEWS, April 2006,
http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/update02178.html.
5
Id.
6
AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert.
granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2006).
7
Id. at 1369–70.
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current international intellectual property system and elaborates on how the
presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law stems from and
supports these principles. Discussion focuses on both the basis of the
presumption in the separation of powers doctrine and institutional
competence of the individual branches of the federal government and the
potential international and national repercussions of the Federal Circuit’s
decision. Part IV concludes by suggesting how the Supreme Court should
consider these principles in its review of AT&T v. Microsoft and
recommends that the Court apply the presumption against extraterritoriality,
interpreting § 271(f) conservatively in the absence of Congressional intent
to do otherwise, so as to avoid international discord and economic harm to
industry.

I. THE HISTORY OF 35 U.S.C. § 271(F)
Section 271(f) of Title 35 8 was enacted by Congress in response to
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 9 a case that exposed an
exploitable loophole for patent infringement. 10 In Deepsouth Packing, a
manufacturer of shrimp deveining machines successfully avoided liability
for patent infringement by manufacturing only components of the machines
in the United States and then shipping the components abroad for final
assembly. 11 Because the patents at issue were combination patents,
infringement could only occur once the various components were
assembled, which in this case was abroad. 12 At the time of Deepsouth
Packing, only § 271(a)–(c) had been enacted and it was clear that the
manufacture and use of a patented device outside the United States was not
an infringement under U.S. patent law. 13 Despite the obvious exposure of
U.S. patent holders to infringement, the Supreme Court refused to expand
the reach of § 271 to acts conducted abroad without “a clear and certain
signal from Congress.” 14 The Court recognized that its precedent strongly
emphasized the territoriality of U.S. patent law and that only Congress had
the constitutional authority to legislate with respect to the extraterritorial
effects of U.S. law. 15
¶3

8

35 U.S.C. § 271(f).
406 U.S. 518 (1972).
10
AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1371.
11
Deepsouth Packing, 406 U.S. at 523–24. Assembly of the machine’s
components was very simple and the manufacturer referred to the components
as the “machine” in its instructions and correspondence with customers.
12
Id. at 528–29.
13
Id. at 527 (discussing Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235
U.S. 641, 650 (1915), Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856)).
14
Id. at 531.
15
Id. at 527, 530—31.
9
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In response to Deepsouth Packing, Congress enacted § 271(f) to
expand the reach of Title 35 and close its exposed infringement loophole to
address the domestic impact of foreign sales of U.S.-patented inventions. 16
The legislative history referred to § 271(f) as a “housekeeping-oriented
measure” enacted to “prevent copiers from avoiding U.S. patents by
supplying components of a patented product in this country so that the
assembly of the components may be completed abroad.” 17
¶4

¶5
Initially the courts were relatively conservative in interpreting the
reach of § 271(f), emphasizing the expressed Congressional intent and the
plain meaning of statutory text. 18 Two cases, Waymark Corp. v. Porta
Systems Corp. 19 and Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 20 illustrate the
Federal Circuit’s concern for both Congressional intent and the territorial
aspect of U.S. patent law. In Waymark, the Federal Circuit held that “the
statutory language in [§ 271(f)(2)] does not require an actual combination of
the components [abroad], but only a showing that the infringer shipped
them with the intent that they be combined.” 21 Thus, liability “attaches
with mere shipment of the component from the United States and does not
consider the presence or absence of acts occurring abroad.” 22 While this
holding made it easier to sue for infringement under § 271(f), the Federal
Circuit reinforced the territoriality of U.S. patent law by explaining that
“[i]f 271(f)(2) required actual assembly abroad, then infringement would
depend on proof of infringement in a foreign country . . . rais[ing] the
difficult obstacle of proving infringement in foreign countries and pos[ing]
the appearance of giving extraterritorial effect to United States patent
protection.” 23 In Pellegrini, the Federal Circuit found that § 271(f) was
“clear on its face. . . . It applies only where components of a patent
invention are physically present in the United States and then either sold or

16

AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert.
granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2006) (discussing 130 Cong. Rec. 28069
(daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (Congressional debate on Patent Law Amendments Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383)).
17
Id.
18
See Virginia Zaunbrecher, Eolas, AT&T & Union Carbide: The New
Extraterritoriality of U.S. Patent Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 33, 37–42
(2006) (discussing the cautious approach of the courts in deciding several cases
after § 271(f)’s enactment).
19
245 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
20
375 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
21
Waymark, 245 F.3d at 1368.
22
AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1373 (Rader, J., dissenting) (discussing
Waymark, 245 F.3d at 1368, as an example of the territorial focus and
application of § 271(f) and U.S. patent law in general).
23
Waymark, 245 F.3d at 1365 (citations omitted); see Zaunbrecher, supra note
18, at 41–42.
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exported.” 24 As such, “the language of § 271(f) clearly contemplates that
there must be an intervening sale or exportation; there can be no liability
under § 271(f)(1) unless components are shipped from the United States for
assembly.” 25 Even though the defendant in Pellegrini supplied instructions
for the production and disposition of components of a patented invention
and provided corporate oversight from its U.S. headquarters, thus
facilitating the production of infringing products, the Federal Circuit refused
to attach liability to its conduct under § 271(f) because the components were
never physically present in the United States. 26 In an axiomatic closing, the
Court cites Dowagiac Manufacturing Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co. to
emphasize that “the right conferred by a patent under our law is confined to
the United States and its territories, and infringement of this right cannot be
predicated on acts wholly done in a foreign country.” 27
¶6
More recently, however, several Federal Circuit decisions have
significantly expanded the scope of § 271(f). In March of 2005, the Federal
Circuit held in Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. that software
code encoded on master disks and exported abroad falls within the scope of
“components” in § 271(f). 28 The case involved Microsoft’s supply of its
Windows operating system bundled with Internet Explorer to licensed
foreign computer manufacturers via “golden master discs.” 29 Eolas alleged
that certain aspects of Microsoft’s Internet Explorer software infringed one
of its software patents 30 and sought damages for infringement from
Microsoft for its foreign sales under § 271(f). 31 Microsoft argued that
software code was not a “component” under the auspices of § 271(f)
because a “component” must be a tangible element like the shrimp
deveining machine components in Deepsouth Packing. 32 The Federal
Circuit disagreed based on a plain interpretation of the statutory language,
lack of clear Congressional prohibition preventing the inclusion of software
within the meaning of “component” under § 271(f), and sound doctrinal

24

Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1117 (emphasis added).
Id.
26
Id. at 1115, 17.
27
Id. at 1119 (discussing Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235
U.S. 641, 650 (1915)).
28
Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1338–41 (Fed. Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 568 (2005).
29
Id. at 1331 (“Golden master disk[]” is the name given to the single master
copy of the software shipped to each manufacturer for use in making subsequent
copies of the software that will then be installed on computers.) Eolas has very
similar facts to AT&T v. Microsoft. See infra Part II.A.
30
U.S. Patent No. 5,838,906 (filed Oct. 17, 1994) (issued Nov. 17, 1998).
31
Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1331–32.
32
Id at 1340.
25
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policy. 33 The Federal Circuit reasoned that the “statutory language did not
limit § 271(f) to patented ‘machines’ or patented ‘physical structures’ . . . or
to ‘machine’ components or ‘structural or physical’ components.” 34 The
Federal Circuit was also swayed by the fact that “[e]xact duplicates of the
software code on the golden master disk are incorporated as an operating
element of the ultimate device . . . [and the code] in effect drives the
‘functional nucleus of the finished computer product.’” 35 Four months
later, the Federal Circuit decided AT&T v. Microsoft, the subject matter of
this iBrief, where it both affirmed its holding in Eolas and further expanded
it by attaching liability under § 271(f) to the foreign-made copies of
software installed on foreign-made computers that are sold abroad.36 Three
months after deciding AT&T v. Microsoft, the Federal Circuit decided
Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.,
which dealt with the sale of a catalyst abroad for use in a patented chemical
process. 37 Using the rationale in Eolas and AT&T v. Microsoft, the Federal
Circuit found that § 271(f) “makes no distinction between patentable
method/process inventions and other forms of patentable inventions,” thus
once again expanding the scope of § 271(f) to now include “components” of
patented processes. 38
¶7
Of these recent cases in which the Federal Circuit has expansively
interpreted § 271(f) and attached liability for conduct occurring wholly
abroad, AT&T v. Microsoft alone now sits before the Supreme Court on
grant of certiorari.

33

Id. at 1339. Regarding policy, the court stated that it could not “construct a
principled reason” to differentiate between different types of inventions. Id.
The court even discussed the TRIPS Agreement: “Patents shall be available and
patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention[]
[and] the field of technology . . . .” Id. (quoting Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the
Uruguay Round, Part II, Section 5, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M.
1125, 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf).
34
Id. at 1339.
35
Id. (discussing Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 299 F. Supp. 2d 550,
553 (E.D. Va. 2003)).
36
AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2006).
37
Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d
1366, 1369–72 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
38
Id. at 1379–80.
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II. AT&T V. MICROSOFT: FACTS, LOWER COURT DECISIONS AND
ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
A. Facts
Similar to Eolas’s action, 39 AT&T’s suit against Microsoft is rooted
in Microsoft’s practice of supplying software to its licensed foreign
computer manufacturers via “golden master disks” or electronic
transmission. 40 The software in question is a version of the Microsoft
Windows operating system utilizing a speech compression code; when
installed on a computer, the speech compression code is protected by
AT&T’s software patent 32,580. 41 Microsoft writes and exports master
copies of the software from the United States to various locations abroad, 42
where it is then copied and installed onto foreign-made computers for sale
in foreign markets. 43 AT&T alleges that Microsoft is liable for
infringement under § 271(f) 44 both for its supply of the master copy of the
software to its manufacturers abroad and for each of the subsequent copies
of the software made and installed onto computers abroad by these
manufacturers. 45
¶8

B. The District Court Proceedings
Based on the facts above, AT&T filed suit against Microsoft for
patent infringement for its sale of the Windows operating system utilizing
AT&T’s speech codec in the United States and abroad. 46 Microsoft
countered by filing a motion in limine to exclude evidence of its foreign
software sales. 47 The parties agreed on a stipulation of the facts, and
Microsoft moved for partial summary judgment of non-infringement under
¶9

39

See id. at 1325.
AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1368.
41
Id. at 1368 n.1 (“A ‘speech codec’ is a software program that codes a speech
signal into a more compact form, and decodes it back into a signal that sounds
like the original.”); see U.S. Patent No. 32,580 (filed Sept. 18, 1986) (reissued
Jan. 1988).
42
AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1373 (Rader, J., dissenting). Microsoft sent
the software code to Dusseldorf, Germany, and Tokyo, Japan, in addition to
New York. Microsoft only contests liability under § 271(f) for copies of the
software made abroad by its foreign manufacturers and installed on foreignmade computers. Id. at 1369.
43
Id. at 1368 (majority opinion); AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No.
01CV4872, 2004 WL 406640, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004).
44
35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000).
45
AT&T v. Microsoft, 2004 WL 406640, at *2.
46
Id. at *1.
47
AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1368.
40
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§ 271(f). 48 Microsoft argued (1) that the software encoded on the golden
master disks and sent by electronic transmission was “merely ‘intangible
information,’ and thus not a ‘component’ as contemplated by § 271(f),” 49
and (2) that it should not be liable under § 271(f) for copies of the software
made and installed onto computers abroad because “the copies themselves
[were] not ‘supplied from’ the United States.” 50 Consistent with the
Federal Circuit in Eolas, the District Court of the Southern District of New
York interpreted § 271(f) broadly by holding that software could be a
“component” under § 271(f) because “[t]here is no limitation on the term
‘component,’ either in the statutory text or in the legislative history” of
§ 271(f) and no indication that the term should be limited. 51 The court then
found that Microsoft “supplied” the software by sending the golden master
disks abroad such that Microsoft was liable for patent infringement under
§ 217(f) for software copies made abroad and installed on foreign-made
machines. 52 Microsoft entered into a settlement agreement for damages
with AT&T after assenting to a stipulated judgment of liability but reserved
the right to appeal the district court’s ruling on the § 271(f) issue. 53

C. The Appellate Court Proceedings
¶10
Before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Microsoft
again argued in favor of a narrower scope of liability under § 271(f) and
was again unsuccessful. 54 First, relying on its holding in Eolas, the
appellate court found software to be a “component” under § 271(f). 55
Because the software “being supplied is an actual component . . . not
instructions to foreign software engineers for designing and coding [the
software],” the court rejected Microsoft’s assertion that Pellegrini applied to
the case. 56 Then, turning to the issue of whether Microsoft had “supplied”

48

Id.
AT&T v. Microsoft, 2004 WL 406640, at *2.
50
Id.
51
Id. at *5.
52
Id. at *7 (“Microsoft seeks to equate replication of the object code abroad with
the manufacturing or ‘supply’ of it from abroad. Microsoft’s argument ignores
the undisputed fact that the object code is originally manufactured in the United
States, and supplied from the United States to foreign replicators or OEMs
[original equipment manufacturers] with the intention of incorporating such
software into foreign-assembled computers.”).
53
AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1368; Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 5, AT&T v. Microsoft, No. 05-1056 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2006), 2006 WL
2805326 [hereinafter Government Brief].
54
AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1368–69, 1372.
55
Id. at 1369; see supra Part I (discussing Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 568 (2005)).
56
AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1370.
49
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the software component from the United States within the meaning of
§ 271(f) such that liability attached to the foreign-produced copies of the
software, the court looked to the text of the statute and interpreted the term
“supply” in a technology-dependent manner, basing its interpretation on the
nature of software technology. 57 The court found that “the act of copying
[software] is subsumed in the act of ‘supplying’ [software] such that
sending a single copy abroad with the intent that it be replicated invokes
§ 271(f) liability for those foreign-made copies.” 58 To support its holding,
the court asserted that its interpretation of “supply” was consistent with the
Congressional intent in enacting § 271(f) 59 and that the interpretation was
necessary for the statutory provision to remain effective. 60 The court stated
that any other interpretation of the statute would “subvert[] the remedial
nature of § 271(f) [to close the loophole exposed by Deepsouth Packing],
permitting a technical avoidance of the statute by ignoring the advances in a
field of technology—and its associated industry practices—that developed
after [§ 271(f)’s enactment].” 61 Relying again on Eolas, the court refused
to draw a distinction between Microsoft’s supplying the software via golden
master disk and supplying the software via electronic transmission, and held
that the software was “supplied” abroad within the meaning of § 271(f) by
both methods of transmission. 62 The court also was not persuaded by
“Microsoft’s impassioned recitation of a parade of horribles that may befall
the domestic software industry” if the court were to find Microsoft liable for
infringement. 63 The court was confident that “Congress intended that the
language it enacted would be applied as [the court] . . . applied it.” 64
¶11
Judge Rader wrote a forceful dissent to the panel majority’s
decision that was somewhat surprising in light of his opinion for the court in
Eolas. 65 While “agreeing that software may be a component of a patented
invention,” he criticized the majority’s broad technology-dependent
interpretation of “supply” in § 271(f) and its disregard for the territoriality
of patent law in the international arena. 66 Judge Rader refuted the majority
assertion that a plain interpretation of § 271(f) includes “copying” within
the meaning of “supplying” and that “copying” is subsumed in the act of

57

Id. at 1369–70.
Id. at 1370.
59
Id. at 1370; see supra Part I (discussing key cases interpreting § 271(f)).
60
AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1371.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 1372.
64
Id. (discussing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 576
(1982)).
65
Id. (Rader, J., dissenting).
66
Id. at 1372–73, 1376.
58
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“supplying” for software code. 67 He stated that “[t]he act of supplying is
separate and distinct from copying, reproducing, or manufacturing,” 68 and
that “[t]he only true difference between making and supplying software
components and physical components is that copies of software components
are easier to make and transport.” 69 Judge Rader stressed that the ease with
which infringement may occur for software code is an incorrect basis upon
which to differentiate between patented inventions under § 271(f). 70 As a
result, Judge Rader found that the majority’s interpretation departed from
the holding of Pellegrini requiring that components “supplied” from the
United States actually physically exist in the United States. 71 Because the
software components that were installed on foreign-made computers abroad
were foreign-made copies of the “supplied” master copy, those components
were never in the United States. 72 Additionally, interpreting § 271(f) in a
technologically-dependent manner “ignores [the Federal Circuit’s] case law
that refuses to discriminate based on the field of technology.” 73
¶12
Judge Rader also drew a clear line between acts that occur in the
United States (“supply” of a master copy of the software to manufacturers
in New York, Dusseldorf, and Tokyo) and acts that occurred abroad
(“copying” of the software by foreign manufacturers and installation of the
copies onto foreign-made computers). 74 He found the majority’s
interpretation of “supply,” as applying to foreign-made copies of software,
to be an extraterritorial expansion of U.S. patent law, creating liability for
acts done wholly abroad that, prior to this case, could incur liability only
under the law of the country in which they occurred. 75 Such a result
67

Id. at 1372–73.
Id. at 1373.
69
Id. at 1374.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 1374–75.
72
Id. (quoting Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (“[Section 271(f)] applies only where components of a patented invention
are physically in the United States and then either sold or exported . . . .”)).
Judge Rader’s stance here is a little surprising in light of the Eolas decision,
which he authored, because finding liability in Eolas necessarily implied a
finding that the software copies replicated abroad from the golden master disks
were supplied from the United States under § 271(f). See Eolas Techs. Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
568 (2005) (“[T]he software code on the golden master disk is not only a
component, it is probably the key part of this patented invention.”).
73
AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1374 (Rader, J., dissenting).
74
Id. at 1373, 1375.
75
Id. at 1373 (discussing Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235
U.S. 641, 650 (1915) (“The right conferred by a patent under our law is confined
to the United States and its Territories and infringement of this right cannot be
predicated on acts wholly done in a foreign country.”)).
68
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contravenes the plain language of § 271(f) to “expressly limit[] liability . . .
to activities occurring in the United States” 76 and the precedent of both the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court with regard to the territorial nature
of U.S. patent law. 77 He emphasized that prior to the majority’s decision in
AT&T v. Microsoft, companies could protect themselves from competitors
copying and manufacturing their software technology in foreign markets
only by “obtaining and enforcing foreign patents.” 78

D. On Grant of Certiorari to the Supreme Court
1. Questions Presented
¶13
Microsoft’s petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari was granted
in October of 2006, 79 and oral arguments were heard on February 21,
2007. 80 Microsoft presented two questions to the Court: “(1) Whether
digital software code—an intangible sequence of ‘1’s’ and ‘0’s’—may be
considered a ‘component[] of a patented invention’ within the meaning of
Section 271(f)(1); and, if so, (2) Whether copies of such a ‘component[]’
made in a foreign country are ‘supplie[d]’ . . . from the United States.” 81
2. Microsoft’s Arguments
¶14
Microsoft presented two theories under which the Court could
conclude that software is not a “component” within the meaning of
§ 271(f). 82 First, Microsoft argued that the Court could avoid deciding
“whether software can ever be a ‘component of a patented invention’ within
the meaning of Section 271(f),” by narrowly deciding whether the “golden
master discs” and electronic transmissions of the software code themselves
were components of the allegedly infringing devices manufactured
abroad. 83 Microsoft, relying on the stipulated facts, asserted that it was
undisputed that the “golden master discs,” the code encoded thereon, the
electronic transmissions, and the code therein, were not components of any
allegedly infringing computers sold abroad; only copies of the code sent
from the United States were encoded onto foreign-made computers sold

76

Id. at 1374.
Id. at 1373–74.
78
Id. at 1376.
79
AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. 467 (2006) (grant of petition for
certiorari).
80
Oral Argument, AT&T v. Microsoft, No. 05-1056 (U.S. argued Feb. 21, 2007).
81
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, AT&T v. Microsoft, No. 05-1056 (U.S. Feb.
17, 2006), 2006 WL 403897 [hereinafter Certiorari Petition].
82
Brief for Petitioner at 34–44, AT&T v. Microsoft, No. 05-1056 (U.S. Dec. 15,
2006), 2006 WL 3693463 [hereinafter Petitioner Brief].
83
Id. at 34.
77
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abroad. 84 Microsoft’s second argument was that binary software code
lacking a physical existence (i.e., not encoded in a physical media) is not a
“component” under § 271(f) because (1) such sequence “is design
information, analogous to product specifications or a recipe,” which can be
used to make a product but is not itself a component of the product, and (2)
such a sequence “is incapable of being ‘combined’ with other components .
. . to practice the invention” as it is neither readable nor executable by a
computer and thus cannot direct a computer “to function as the device
claimed in the patent.” 85
¶15
For the second question presented—whether copies of software
made abroad can be supplied from the U.S for the purposes of § 271(f)—
Microsoft had two main arguments. First, Microsoft claimed that under a
plain reading of the statute its conduct should not incur liability under
§ 271(f). 86 Microsoft also maintained that both the majority and the dissent
of the Federal Circuit panel and AT&T itself recognized that the software
code installed on foreign-made computers were copies created by foreign
manufacturers abroad and not actually supplied from the U.S by
Microsoft. 87 Thus, Microsoft argued that the Federal Circuit’s majority
erred in conflating “copying” with “supplying” specifically for software
inventions. 88 Microsoft indicated that such an interpretation was also
impermissible in the absence of Congressional intent that software should
be treated differently under the patent laws than other types of inventions. 89
Thus, to apply § 271(f) consistently to all types of inventions, liability
cannot attach to the foreign-made software copies because the physical
embodiment of the software code on the foreign-made copies was not the
“very same” physical embodiment of the master code supplied by
Microsoft; the copies were not created in the United States. 90
¶16
Also with respect to the second question before the Court,
Microsoft focused on how statutory principles of construction prohibit an

84

Id. at 35.
Id. at 38.
86
Id. at 14–15.
87
Id. at 15–17, 23.
88
Id. at 18–19
89
Id. at 20–23.
90
Id. at 24–26. Microsoft drew an analogy between current modes of storing
software code (e.g., DVDs, CDs, hard drives) and player piano music rolls and
early computer punch-card technology; each being a physical embodiment of
instructions to tell a device how to function. Id. at 23–25. Microsoft argued
that, if the software code in the case at hand was embodied on punch-cards
instead of on CDs or DVDs, it would be obvious that the copies of the software
made abroad for use with foreign-made computers truly were not supplied from
the United States. Id. at 25.
85
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expansive reading of the provision. 91 Microsoft argued that Congress did
not intend to reach circumstances such as that presented here (i.e., where
foreign-made copies are combined abroad); rather, “mak[ing] no mention of
copies,” Congress “prohibited the supply of ‘components’ where ‘such
components’—that is, the originals—may be combined overseas.” 92 In
light of this, Microsoft asserted that the Federal Circuit was acting in a
legislative manner “to ensure that Section 271(f) ‘remain[s] effective,’”
which raised separation of powers issues. 93 Furthermore, the presumption
against extraterritorial application of U.S. law—arising out of comity, the
territoriality of U.S. law, and separation of powers—limits the reach of
§ 271(f) and prohibits a statutory interpretation that would enable
extraterritorial effects. 94
3. AT&T’s Arguments
¶17
In response to Microsoft, AT&T first raised procedural arguments.
AT&T maintained that, if the proper question before the Court was the
narrower question of whether the golden master disk and electronic
transmission of the software code themselves were components of the
devices manufactured abroad, then the Court should dismiss the writ as
improvidently granted.95 Alternatively, AT&T asserted that the argument is
“neither preserved nor correct” and is thus waived because Microsoft did
not raise it in the courts below or in its petition for certiorari. 96
¶18
AT&T’s interpretation of the term “component” within the meaning
of § 271(f) encompassed both the physical and intangible parts of a
system. 97 AT&T pointed out that “component” means “‘a constituent part’
or ‘ingredient’” and is not limited to physical parts of a system or device. 98
Additionally, the term “component” is “routinely used to describe software
independent of any physical format, whether as part of a computer system
consisting of both hardware and software or as part of a larger non-physical
software program.” 99 AT&T reasoned that Congress could have chosen to
limit the scope of § 271(f) to physical components of a patented invention
in the language of the statute but did not because “[i]ntangible ‘[software]
code . . . is not only a component,’ but [is] ‘the key part’ of virtually any

91

Id. at 26–33.
Id. at 27–28.
93
Id. at 29 (citation omitted).
94
Id. at 29–30.
95
Brief for Respondent at 17, AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-1056
(U.S. Jan. 2007), 2006 WL 789602 [hereinafter Respondent Brief].
96
Id.
97
Id. at 19.
98
Id. (citations removed).
99
Id. at 20.
92
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invention practiced through software.” 100 Thus, AT&T asserted that “if
object code as such did not qualify as a ‘component’ of such products,
Section 271(f) would have no meaningful application to the software
industry,” which could not have been the intent of Congress. 101
¶19
AT&T supported its statutory interpretation by arguing that
“[o]bject code is an essential component of software technology even if it
must be combined with physical components to function” and further
reasoned that intangible software code is like any other component that has
no utility on its own and needs to be combined with another component to
yield a functional device. 102 AT&T stated that “combining intangible
object code with physical components such as a hard drive or CD to make
software technology work within a variety of computer systems” reflects the
“basic structure of modern computer technology.” 103 As such, for software
it does not make sense to try and distinguish “instructions” from patented
“product” because “the product is a machine that contains and continuously
performs the ‘instructions’ expressed in object code.” 104
¶20
Based on the above arguments, AT&T maintained that Microsoft
did supply intangible object code from the United States for combination
with other components abroad and is thus liable under § 271(f) for the
foreign-made copies combined with foreign-made computers. 105 Disputing
Microsoft’s arguments regarding “supply” of components from the United
States, AT&T pointed out that Microsoft’s position is based on incorrect
reasoning regarding whether software code is a “component.” 106
¶21
Finally, AT&T found no solid policy reason to disregard the plain
meaning of the statute and exclude intangible components from within the
scope of § 271(f). 107 AT&T asserted that Microsoft’s arguments would
essentially amount to a repeal of § 271(f) with regards to software
components, creating a special exception in the patent laws amongst
technologies for software and leaving software inventors in the United
States open to free-riding abroad. 108 In practice, Microsoft’s position would
mean that only the copy of the software embodied on a physical medium
100

Id. at 22 (quoting Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 568 (2005)).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 23.
103
Id. at 24.
104
Id. at 28.
105
Id. at 28, 32–33.
106
Id. at 28–30.
107
Id. at 36.
108
Id. at 37–41. AT&T points out that U.S. companies can avoid liability by
sending instructions as to how to write the software code abroad, as opposed to
sending the complete code itself. Id. at 36–37.
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and sent abroad could be considered a “component” under § 271(f); thus,
there would be no liability for any software installed on a computer abroad
after being shipped from the United States. 109 Additionally, AT&T
reasoned that the presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply
because (1) the conduct at issue did occur in the United States (Microsoft
“ship[ed] its U.S.-developed, U.S.-tested Windows software from the
United States” abroad), 110 (2) the presumption “operates only to break
interpretive ties when a statute is ambiguous as to its geographic scope,”
which was not the case here, 111 (3) § 271(f) was created to overcome the
presumption in situations defined by the statute’s plain language, 112 (4)
Microsoft did not cite any authority that application of § 271(f) to its
conduct runs counter to any foreign nation’s policy, 113 and (5) Congress
enacted § 271(f) so that U.S. patent holders would not need to seek foreign
patent protection or redress for infringement abroad. 114 AT&T concluded
that it is up to Congress to alter the balance it has set between U.S. patent
holders and component suppliers, innovation and competition. 115
4. Amicus Curiae Briefs
¶22
Amicus curiae briefs were submitted by representatives of different
industries, academics and practitioners, and the Court solicited the opinion
of the Department of Justice. 116 While the briefs contained arguments both
for and against the inclusion of software within the term “component” under
§ 271(f), where addressed, they almost unanimously disagreed with the
Federal Circuit’s disregard for the inherency of territoriality in U.S.

109

Id. at 39.
Id. at 41.
111
Id. at 42.
112
Id. at 42–43.
113
Id. at 44–46.
114
Id. at 46.
115
Id. at 47–49.
116
The following parties have filed amicus curiae briefs with the Supreme Court
for this appeal: Software & Information Industry Association (“SIIA”); Business
Software Alliance (“BSA”); Amazon.com, Inc. et al.; Yahoo! Inc.; Intel Corp.;
Autodesk, Inc.; Shell Oil Co.; Intellectual Property Professors; Software
Freedom Law Center (“SFLC”); Fédération Internationale Des Conseils en
Propriété Industrielle (“FICPI”); the Solicitor General; American Intellectual
Property Law Association (“AIPLA”); Eli Lilly, BayhDoyle25.inc; U.S. Philips
Corp.; Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation et al.; Professor Edward Lee;
Software Freedom Law Center; the Houston Intellectual Property Law Assoc.,
and the Patent, Trademark & Copyright Section of the District of Columbia.
110
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intellectual property law as a part of the international intellectual property
right system. 117

III. 35 U.S.C. 271(F) SHOULD BE INTERPRETED CONSERVATIVELY
TO AVOID INTERNATIONAL DISCORD AND NATIONAL HARM
A. Extraterritorial application of U.S. patent law will disrupt the
comity-based international scheme of intellectual property rights.
¶23
The presumption against extraterritoriality is a “longstanding
principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States.’” 118 The presumption “serves to protect against
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations[,] which
could result in international discord.” 119 A cornerstone of this presumption
is the doctrine of comity, which is defined as “[a] practice among political
entities (as nations, states, or courts of different jurisdictions), involving
esp[ecially] mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial
acts.” 120 Comity reflects the respect of one sovereign nation for another.
¶24
Comity considerations are a significant factor in all major
international intellectual property treaties, including the Paris Convention121
and TRIPS Agreement. 122 The United States is a signatory of both these
treaties. A governing principle of these treaties arising out of comity is

117

Respondent Brief, supra note 95, at 46. Of the amicus briefs filed that
address the application of the presumption against extraterritorial to § 271(f),
Microsoft, Intellectual Property Professors, SIIA, Intel, FICPI, Yahoo, and the
United States support the application of the presumption, while
BayhDoyle25.inc opposes it.
118
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)
(quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
119
Id.
120
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 284 (8th ed. 2004). The entry also quotes Hilton
v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895) (“‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is neither
a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good
will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its
own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.”). Id.
121
Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention], available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/. The treaty has been amended several
times (most recently in 1979).
122
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 33.
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national treatment. 123 National treatment is “[t]he policy or practice of a
country that accords the citizens of other countries the same intellectual
property protection as it gives its own citizens, with no formal treaty of
reciprocity required.” 124 National treatment “allows countries the autonomy
to develop and enforce their own laws, while meeting the demands for
international protection. Effectively, national treatment is a mechanism of
international protection without harmonization.” 125 Thus, the reliance on
national treatment in these treaties has permitted nations to ensure
protection for patentable inventions while maintaining independent patent
law systems. 126 This is in contrast to international copyright treaties where
the trend has been towards harmonization. 127 However, the national
treatment principle is a core principle in international copyright treaties, and
it maintains a strong presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S.

123

See World Intellectual Property Organization, Summary of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property (1883),
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary_paris.html (last visited Mar.
25, 2007) (Applying broadly to all intellectual property rights, the Convention’s
substantive provisions “fall into three main categories: national treatment, right
of priority, [and] common rules.”); World Trade Organization, TRIPS: A More
Detailed Overview of the TRIPS Agreement,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Mar. 25,
2007) (“[T]he Agreement provides for certain basic principles, such as national
and most-favoured-nation treatment, and some general [procedural] rules . . .
[and] requires Member countries to make patents available for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology without
discrimination, subject to the normal tests of novelty, inventiveness and
industrial applicability.”). The author benefited greatly from discussing this
topic with Professor Reichman.
124
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1054 (8th ed. 2004).
125
Id. (quoting LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW 5 (Oxford Univ. Press, USA 2004) (2001)).
126
See Andrew J. Sherman, International Protection of Brands and Patents,
KAUFFMAN EVENTURING, Aug. 1, 2006,
http://www.eventuring.org/eShip/Redirect?key=Entrepreneurship/Resource/Res
ource_569.htm (discussing the international treaties that govern patent rights).
127
See the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
(PARIS ACT) July 24, 1971, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986), 1161 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force Mar. 1, 1989) available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/, for the primary treaty governing
international copyright law requirements. This treaty has resulted in significant
international harmonization of copyright protections. Michael Trenholm and
John Holcomb, International Intellectual Property Conventions, RIVERSIDE
LAWYER, Sept. 2006, at 14, 15, available at
http://riversidecountybar.com/barpubs/0609RL.pdf.
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intellectual property laws. 128 As such, the territorial nature of intellectual
property law is implicit in the principles of comity and national
treatment. 129 Guided by these principles, the judiciary has largely avoided
“act[ing] in a manner that might disrupt Congress’s efforts to secure a more
stable international intellectual property regime unless Congress otherwise
clearly has expressed its intent . . . [as such action] might well send the
signal that the United States does not believe that the protection accorded by
the laws of other member nations is adequate.” 130
¶25
The Federal Circuit’s ruling in AT&T v. Microsoft, expanding the
interpretation of § 271(f) to encompass acts conducted outside the territorial
limits of the United States, will disrupt this international scheme with
regards to both software patent infringement and other areas of intellectual
property right enforcement more generally. For example, technologydriven e-commerce, in which software plays a significant role, is an
important aspect of today’s economy, both nationally and internationally.
While software is protected in the United States and abroad by copyright
law, patent protection for software is much less uniform. 131 Software is
patentable in the United States and Japan, but patentability in Europe varies
from country to country. 132 In fact, software patentability is a hotly-debated

128

See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Comm. Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir.
1994) (en banc) (“[I]t is commonly acknowledged that the national treatment
principle implicates a rule of territoriality.”). The Court in Subafilms discusses
how U.S. treaty obligations under the newly joined Berne Convention and newly
created TRIPS Agreement influence its decision to interpret the Copyright Act
conservatively. Id. at 1097–1098. The significance of this case in copyright law
was pointed out to the author by Professor Reichman.
129
See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972)
(“Our patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial effect; ‘these acts of
Congress do not, and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the
United States,’ and we correspondingly reject the claims of others to such
control over our markets.”) (citations omitted).
130
Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1097–98.
131
See Fenwick & West LLP, 2006 Update: International Legal Protection for
Software Chart Spring 2006, http://www.softwareprotection.com/chart.htm (last
visited Apr. 2, 2007), for a general chart describing patent and copyright
protection in different countries and applicable treaties, and World Intellectual
Property Organization, Business Method and Computer Software Patents,
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/e_commerce/computer_software.htm (last visited
Apr. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Business Method and Computer Software Patents],
which generally describes the state of software patentability in the world.
132
Fenwick & West LLP, International Legal Protection for Software, Patent
Protection, http://www.softwareprotection.com/patent.htm (last visited Apr. 2,
2007) [hereinafter International Legal Protection for Software]; Business
Method and Computer Software Patents, supra note 131. These articles discuss
how, despite the fact that software is patentable under the European Patent
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issue in the European Union on which member states have yet to reach a
consensus. 133 Because the state of patent protection for software is
unsettled in Europe, the imposition of U.S. patent law abroad, particularly
in a manner that creates protection for software, will cause “serious risk of
interference with a foreign nation’s ability to regulate its own affairs.” 134
The extraterritorial reach of § 271(f) as interpreted by the Federal Circuit in
AT&T v. Microsoft will also cause “difficult choice-of-law problems . . .
that the federal courts’ general adherence to the territoriality principle
largely has obviated [until now].” 135 In addition, such protection under U.S.
patent law may deter inventors from obtaining patents outside the United
States for their inventions and thus “threatens to disrupt foreign nations’
patent law schemes.” 136
¶26
Importantly, comity and related principles of international law also
support the position that § 271(f) should be repealed in its entirety, as
suggested by recent patent reform bills. 137 Even narrowly construed,

Convention, the national nature of patent prosecution and litigation in the
European Union has resulted in variable software patent protection (patent
issuance and enforcement) from country to country. See also State St. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(holding that a numerical calculation that produces a "useful, concrete and
tangible result" is patentable).
133
See Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, American-Style Patents Won’t Cross the
Pond to EU, EWEEK.COM, July 6, 2005, http://www.eweek.com (search
“American-style patents”; then follow article hyperlink); Software Patent Bill
Thrown Out, BBC NEWS, July 6, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4655955.stm. These articles describe the
controversial Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions, COM (2002)
92 final (Feb. 20, 2002), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2002/com2002_0092en01.pdf,
and its failure to be enacted by the European Parliament on July 6, 2005.
134
See Certiorari Petition, supra note 81, at 28 (discussing how “subjecting
foreign manufacturer’s to the requirements of U.S. patent law” will disrupt the
intellectual property law systems of foreign nations); cf. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche
Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) (discussing the presumption
against extraterritoriality in the context of applying U.S. antitrust laws to
conduct that occurs outside the United States).
135
See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Comm. Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir.
1994) (en banc). “Although the [copyright] treaties do not expressly discuss
choice-of-law rules, it is commonly acknowledged that the national treatment
principle implicates a rule of territoriality.” Id. at 1097.
136
Certiorari Petition, supra note 81, at 13.
137
See Patents and Global Drug Development, PHARMA FOCUS ASIA, Feb. 2007,
http://www.pharmafocusasia.com/magazine/previous_issue/coverstory.htm
(“Since being introduced [on 8 June 2005], various substitutes of [H.R. 2795,
the Patent Act of 2005] have been proposed in an attempt to reach agreement
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§ 271(f) represents an extraterritorial measure in U.S. law. It would be
more in accordance with these principles for U.S. patent law to require the
inventor of any given invention (e.g., a shrimp deveining machine) to apply
for foreign patents where protection for the invention is desired abroad.
Patent schemes vary from country to country and differences should be
respected as reflecting the policy choices of sovereign nations. Inventions
that are patentable in one country may not be patentable in another for a
variety of reasons (e.g., subject matter, date of invention or filing, etc.).
Thus, the question arises as to why U.S. patent law should extend in these
circumstances to provide patent protection against competitors in the United
States while no protection can be obtained abroad. AT&T argued that
“Congress enacted Section 271(f) because it understood that foreign patent
protections are sometimes weaker than their U.S. counterparts, and because
it wished to spare U.S. patent-holders from the considerable expense of
obtaining patent protections in dozens of foreign jurisdictions.” 138
However, this point of view is both out-of-date and directly counter to the
principles underlying the significant international intellectual property
treaties to which the United States has become a member since the
enactment of § 271(f). 139 The benefits of § 271(f) are also called into
question when U.S. companies either face tremendous potential
infringement liability, diminished competitiveness, or the choice of moving
development and manufacturing operations outside of the United States. 140

B. Separation of powers supports the presumption against
extraterritorial application of U.S. law.
The Federal Circuit’s ability to disrupt the patent law schemes of
foreign nations illustrates why the presumption against extraterritoriality
also reflects the institutional roles and competence of the different branches
¶27

between interested parties. One proposed substitute known as The Coalition
Print was suggested by a coalition of major US corporations in September 2005.
Section 6(b) of The Coalition Print would repeal 35 U.S.C 271.”); see also Brief
of BSA as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 21–22, AT&T Corp. v.
Microsoft Corp., No. 05-1056 (U.S. Dec. 15, 2006) (pointing out that H.R. 2795,
109th Cong. § 5 (2005) (proposing to amend § 271(f) to limit “component” to
“tangible item[s] that [are themselves] combined physically with other
components to create the combination that is alleged to infringe”), and S. 3818,
109th Cong. § 5 (2006) (proposing an outright repeal of Section 271(f)), “evince
a desire to ensure that software is on the same footing as other patentable
material, and that it should receive neither increased scrutiny nor added
protections.”). The author is grateful to Professor Rai for pointing out this
argument.
138
Respondent Brief, supra note 95, at 46.
139
See supra Part III.A.
140
Certiorari Petition, supra note 81, at 20; infra Part III.C.2.
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of the federal government. Under the United States Constitution, the
executive branch, with the consent of the Senate, has the power to enter into
treaties, while the legislative branch has the power to regulate commerce. 141
By interpreting § 271(f) in a technology-dependent manner, the Federal
Circuit moved liability for infringement of a U.S. patent into the realm of
international law, affecting past and future trade negotiations and interfering
with the functions of the other federal branches. 142 As such, the Federal
Circuit’s decision to interpret § 271(f) expansively is unwise because “the
legislative and executive branches are much better equipped than the
judiciary to evaluate the complex foreign policy considerations raised by the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law.” 143 In addition, if Congress wants
§ 271(f) to reflect the advances in software technology since its enactment,
it can amend the statute; the judiciary should not take it upon itself to update
the law through case interpretation. 144 Thus, separation of powers and
141

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (Treaty Power), art. II, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce
Clause).
142
See Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1856) (discussing how
the power of Congress to “promote the progress of science and the useful arts” is
“separate and distinct” from the power of the Executive to enter into treaties and
the power of Congress to regulate commerce); Brief for FICPI as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 8–9, AT&T v. Microsoft, No. 05-1056 (U.S. Dec. 14,
2006), 2006 WL 3805865 [hereinafter FICPI Brief] (arguing that the United
States has the duty, as a signatory of the Paris Convention, “to adopt in
accordance with its constitution, the measures necessary to ensure the
application of this Convention” and that for “§ 271(f) to extend to foreign
countries, there must be a special agreement between the United States and the
foreign countries by treaty, not by unilateral act of Congress”); Petitioner Brief,
supra note 82, at 31 (“The presumption against the extraterritorial application of
U.S. law is especially strong in the patent context because the application of
U.S. patent law to foreign commercial activity intrudes upon other nations’
intellectual property law systems and thereby creates a significant risk of
international discord.”).
143
Certiorari Petition, supra note 81, at 23 (discussing Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc.
v. Watermann S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (asserting that “the
Judiciary has neither the aptitude, facilities nor responsibility” to make decisions
affecting international relations)).
144
See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530–31 (1972)
(refusing to interpret § 271(f) expansively in the absence of a “clear and certain
signal from Congress” because “the sign of how far Congress has chosen to go
[to promote the progress of science and the useful arts] can come only from
Congress”); AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2005), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2006) (Rader, J., dissenting)
(discussing the policy of Deepsouth); Government Brief, supra note 53, at 14
(giving the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1204 (2000)), as an example of
intellectual property right legislation enacted by Congress to address the
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institutional competence concerns weigh in favor of judicial restraint in
interpreting § 271(f). 145

C. The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 271(f) will disrupt
foreign relations and harm the national software industry.
1. Foreign Relations
¶28
Extraterritorial application of U.S. law dramatically elevates the
risk of international discord due to the potential for interference with the
intellectual property systems of other sovereign nations. 146 By interpreting
the term “supplying” to include “copying” for software technology in AT&T
v. Microsoft, the Federal Circuit created liability for patent infringement
under § 271(f) for acts conducted outside the United States. 147 In so doing,
the court imposed this country’s policy choice to provide patent protection
for software on other countries. The countries to which Microsoft shipped
master copies of the software code, Germany and Japan, illustrate how this
can be a problem. As discussed above, patent protection for software is not
a settled issue in Europe, and enforcement of software patents in Germany
specifically is rarely successful. 148 Additionally, patent protection for

technological advances of the digital era); Brief of Intel Corp. as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 15–16, AT&T v. Microsoft, No. 05-1056 (U.S. Dec.
15, 2006) (discussing “the lesson of Deepsouth:” that “it is up to Congress, not
the courts, to extend the territorial scope of U.S. patent law to address modern
developments in technology and international trade”).
145
See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978) (“It is our duty to construe the
patent statutes as they now read in light of our precedents, and we must proceed
cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly
unforeseen by Congress.”).
146
See F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004)
(discussing how the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law
“helps the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work together in
harmony”).
147
AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1370.
148
See Wendy M. Grossman, Euro Software Patents Pending, WIRED NEWS,
Mar. 19, 2005, http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,66938,00.html
(describing how software patents granted by the European Patent Office have
not been enforced in Germany); Wikipedia, Software patents under the
European Patent Convention,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_patent_under_the_European_Patent_Con
vention (naming the German Federal Court cases rejecting “monopoly claims to
computers and programs operating thereon”) (as of Apr. 2, 2007, 12:30 EST); R.
G. C. Jenkins & Co., Computer Program Inventions Before the German
Supreme Court—A Brief Summary,
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software in Japan has also recently come into question. 149 The
extraterritorial application of § 271(f) thus brings U.S. law into direct
conflict with the intellectual property schemes of other nations and can
affect the ability of foreign governments to regulate their own affairs as they
see fit. 150 Such exportation of U.S. law could thereby disrupt American
foreign relations and negatively impact future international negotiations. 151
Furthermore, enforcing U.S. law within foreign jurisdictions may provoke
retaliation by the countries affected. 152 Such retaliation could include the
expansion of foreign laws to encompass activities within the United States,
diminished comity towards U.S. law, and even reduction in trade
relations. 153 Thus, an expansive reading of § 271(f) by the judiciary not only
risks harming the standing of the United States in the international arena,
but also could destabilize the international scheme of intellectual property

http://www.jenkins-ip.com/serv/serv_10.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2007)
(summarizing key software patent cases where patentability of software requires
the invention to be of “a technical nature”).
149
See Emma Barraclough, Japan’s Top IP Judges Overturn Panasonic Patent,
MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEWS, Oct. 1, 2005,
http://www.managingip.com (search for “Japan Panasonic Patent”; then follow
hyperlink for article) (discussing the Japanese Intellectual Property High Court
invalidation of Panasonic’s software patent in an infringement suit, despite the
fact that Japan is typically considered to be much in line with the United States
regarding the patentability of software).
150
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. in Support of Petitioner at 18, AT&T
v. Microsoft, No. 05-1056 (U.S. Dec. 15, 2006), 2006 WL 3723904 [hereinafter
Yahoo Brief] (“These nations are actively engaged in deciding how and under
what circumstances software should be patentable. Interference with their
carefully made decisions in unlikely to be eagerly welcome.”).
151
See Brief for Amicus Curiae Bar of D.C., Patent, Trademark & Copyright
Section in Support of Neither Party at 10, AT&T v. Microsoft, No. 05-1056 (U.S.
Dec. 15, 2006), 2006 WL 3740356 (“Regardless of whether a violation of
TRIPS has occurred, the Federal Circuit should be cognizant of possible
missteps that would cause the United States to suffer international
repercussions.”); World Intellectual Property Organization, Substantive Patent
Law Harmonization, http://www.wipo.int/patent/law/en/harmonization.htm (last
visited Mar. 25, 2007) (describing the current drafting of the Substantive Patent
Law Treaty); FICPI Brief, supra note 142, at 20 (discussing the failure of the
European Union’s proposed Directive on software patentability and the

impasse of the international negotiations over the Substantive Patent Law
Treaty, partly due to the scope of software patentability).
152

Certiorari Petition, supra note 81, at 28–29. While AT&T v. Microsoft only
deals with Microsoft’s activities in Japan and Germany, the impact of the
Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 271(f) will reach all foreign markets.
153
Id.
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rights. 154 To avoid these problems, a company wanting to protect its
foreign market shares from competitors must look to the patent law of those
countries and, where protection is unavailable (i.e., software is not
patentable or protection is not enforced), such companies must abide by the
policy choices of those sovereign nations and not look to U.S. patent law for
protection.
2. Domestic Economic Harm
¶29
In addition to its international effects, the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of § 271(f) will also likely result in significant harm to the
U.S. software industry. 155 American companies will be competitively
disadvantaged abroad due to the fact that they, unlike their foreign
competitors, are potentially exposed to expansive secondary liability for
infringement under § 271(f) for their activities abroad. 156 The potential for
liability is significant because the U.S. software industry has accumulated
huge numbers of software patents. 157 Because the practice of shipping
master copies of software abroad for manufacturing purposes was a
permissible activity prior to the Federal Circuit’s holding, American
companies who have followed this practice are also now subject to what is
essentially a de facto compulsory licensing scheme by the ex post
application of the Federal Circuit’s new expansive reading of § 271(f). 158
154

See discussion supra Part III.A; see also JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS,
SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY 3 (Harvard University Press 1997) (1996) (discussing how the United
States has become the world's most vigorous and effective champion of
strengthened intellectual property rights). By interfering with the intellectual
property regimes of other nations, the United States harms its reputation as
champion of intellectual property rights.
155
See Brief Amici Curiae of Intellectual Property Professors in Support of
Reversal at 11–12, AT&T v. Microsoft, No. 05-1056 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2006), 2006
WL 3740618.
156
Id.
157
See Certiorari Petition, supra note 81, at 20 (discussing “the looming threat
of crippling global liability” U.S. companies face and the high risk due to the
“thousands of unexploited patents that comprise the ‘modern patent thicket’”).
158
See AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2006) (Rader, J., dissenting)
(discussing how, prior to AT&T v. Microsoft, companies needed to seek
protection for inventions abroad under the laws of other countries); Certiorari
Petition, supra note 81, at 20, 22 (discussing the “daunting and unforeseen”
potential infringement damages U.S. companies now face and how this
“jeopardizes the billions of dollars of investments that American hightechnology business have made in overseas manufacturing facilities”). The
Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 271(f) would create a situation much like a
de facto compulsory licensing system because companies like Microsoft, who
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The extent of liability that such companies will incur if prosecuted will be
unexpected and financially detrimental and, as a result, may drive many
companies out of business. 159 In addition, the threat of such liability may
force companies within the United States to relocate their research and
development divisions outside the United States to avoid liability, and it
could deter new technology-businesses from locating operations within the
United States in the first place. 160 The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of
“supplies” also opens the door to expanded liability in the semiconductor,
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries as well. 161

developed business models using foreign manufacturers to copy software for
foreign markets, in reliance on the state of the law prior to AT&T v. Microsoft,
will be forced now to either license the software for use abroad, risk liability for
infringement under § 271(f), or incur the heavy costs of redesigning their
business models.
159
Certiorari Petition, supra note 81, at 22. American companies that have such
foreign manufacturing facilities will not have considered this liability in their
foreign investment calculations and now may incur significant costs in changing
their business strategy. Such companies also did not have the opportunity to
negotiate better licensing terms than will be imposed by the courts. An example
of the potential damages that can arise from expansive liability under § 271(f) is
the recent verdict against Microsoft for $1.52 billion in damages for
infringement (in the United States and abroad) of two software patents held by
Lucent-Alcatel: this is the largest damages award for patent infringement to
date. See Special Verdict Form, Lucent Techs. Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. (2007)
(No. 02cv2060-B(CAB)), available at
http://www.casd.uscourts.gov/casd/filerev.nsf/a4224145c26d1ccb88256913007f
6e67/eaddc4a24ae1242d8825728b00047562?OpenDocument; Jeff St. Onge and
Bill Callahan, Microsoft Told to Pay Alcatel-Lucent $1.52 Billion (Update 7),
BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 22, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com (search “Search
News” for “Alcatel-Lucent”; then follow article hyperlink).
160
Certiorari Petition, supra note 81, at 22.
161
See Certiorari Petition, supra note 81, at 21 (discussing how the Federal
Circuit’s expansive interpretation of ‘component’ of a patented invention opens
the door to liability in the semiconductor and biotechnology industries); Brief of
SIIA as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18–19, AT&T v. Microsoft, No.
05-1056, 2006 WL 3740362 [hereinafter SIIA Brief]; Patents and Global Drug
Development, PHARMA FOCUS ASIA, Feb. 2007,
http://www.pharmafocusasia.com/magazine/previous_issue/coverstory.htm. In
the face of such open-ended liability, there have been moves in Congress to
amend and repeal § 271(f); see also supra text accompanying notes 137–40.
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD STRIKE DOWN THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT’S EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF § 271(F) IF SOFTWARE
IS A “COMPONENT” OF A PATENTABLE INVENTION
¶30
The first issue before the Supreme Court is “[w]hether software
object code can be a component of a patented invention” within the
meaning of § 271(f).” 162 There are strong arguments on both sides of this
issue, and it rests with the Court to direct future application of Title 35 to
software. 163 Only if the Court concludes that software code can be a
“component” under § 271(f) will it reach the second issue presented:
“[w]hether copies of such software object code are ‘supplie[d]’ from the
United States when those copies are created overseas by replicating a
separate master version supplied from the United States.” 164 If the Supreme
Court does reach this second issue, it should strike down the Federal
Circuit’s software-specific interpretation of “supply” within the context of
§ 271(f) as contrary to the presumption against extraterritorial application of
U.S. law.
¶31
In construing § 271(f), the Court should “assume that Congress
legislates against the backdrop of the presumption against
extraterritoriality.” 165 According to the general rules of statutory
construction, the Court should look first to the text of the statute and then to
the legislative history. 166 In considering whether to apply the presumption,
the Court should assess these sources to determine whether Congress has
expressed a clear intent for the statute to have extraterritorial effects. In the
absence of clearly expressed Congressional intent, “as long as ‘the statute’s
language reasonably permits an interpretation consistent with’ the general
presumption that Congress seeks to avoid interference with other nations’
sovereignty, a court ‘should adopt [that interpretation]’” even if it is not the

162

Government Brief, supra note 53, at I.
See, e.g.,Yahoo Brief, supra note 150, at 8–9 (software code on the golden
master disks is a form of instructions that, when installed on computers, creates
a component); SIIA Brief, supra note 161, at 9 (“[A] ‘component’ . . . in the
context of computer code must refer to the particular instance of the computer
code that is downloaded onto, and thus physically part of, an accused computer
system.”); Government Brief, supra note 53, at 7–10 (Software is not
“intangible information” because it has a physical presence; software can be a
component because it can be “a part, element or ingredient of a patented
invention.”).
164
Government Brief, supra note 53, at I. In the author’s opinion, the court is
likely to answer the first question in the affirmative based on its own and the
Federal Circuit’s software patent jurisprudence.
165
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
166
See AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1369–71 (Fed. Cir.
2005), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2006).
163
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more natural reading. 167 Thus, if it is possible to interpret a statute without
causing the law to have extraterritorial effects, the Court should do so where
Congress has not clearly indicated that the law should have such effects.
Comity considerations and the territorial nature of patent law compel this
approach. 168
¶32
The language of § 271(f) is, on its face, general and technologyneutral. Because the term “supply” is not defined in Title 35, it should be
interpreted as having its “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”169
As Judge Rader indicated, “‘suppl[ying]’ . . . does not include ‘copying,’
‘replicating,’ or ‘reproducing’—in effect ‘manufacturing.’” 170 Copying “is
a separate and distinct act” from “suppl[ying].” 171 This ordinary
interpretation of the term “supplies” is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s
practice of applying U.S. patent law in a technology-neutral manner and
even with the majority’s rationale in AT&T v. Microsoft for interpreting the
term to encompass “copying.”172 It is clear from § 271(f)’s twenty-year-old
legislative history that the provision was primarily enacted to close the
patent-infringement loophole exposed in Deepsouth Packing. 173 While
§ 271(f) may have been a remedial measure to stop-gap this loophole,
“[n]othing in § 271(f) or its enacting documents expresses an intent to
attach liability to manufacturing activities occurring wholly abroad” or an
intent that the statute be interpreted in a technology-dependent manner. 174
Thus, Judge Rader was correct in interpreting “supply” within the scope of
§ 271(f) in a more accurate and technology-neutral manner such that
providing one copy of a software code abroad would not cause liability for

167

Petitioner Brief, supra note 82, at 30 (quoting F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v.
Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 174 (2004)) (citations omitted).
168
See Certiorari Petition, supra note 81, at 24 (discussing how “[e]ven where
Congress has unequivocally expressed its intention to give a U.S. law
extraterritorial effect, the parameters of that authority must be strictly construed
in light of the general presumption against extraterritoriality”).
169
AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1369 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
420, 431 (2000)).
170
Id .at 1372 (Rader, J., dissenting).
171
Id.
172
Id. at 1374. Judge Rader points out that the majority’s interpretation of
“supplies” was based on the ease with which software code can be copied and
transported, not on the principle that the two acts are the same thing.
173
See id. (discussing 130 Cong. Rec. 28069 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984)
(Congressional debate on Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98622, 98 Stat. 3383) (“This proposal responds to the United States Supreme Court
decision in Deepsouth Packing . . . concerning the need for a legislative solution
to close a loophole in patent law.”); see also supra text accompanying notes 11–
15.
174
AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1375 (Rader, J., dissenting).
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any subsequent copies made that are combined with computers to create
what would be infringing devices in the United States.
¶33
Judge Rader’s interpretation, “accord[ing] the same treatment to all
forms of invention,” is consistent with prior § 271(f) jurisprudence, and
avoids irritating comity. 175 In addition, the significant burden that has been
imposed on the U.S. software industry can also be avoided by not attaching
liability to foreign-made copies of software. These factors, coupled with
the lack of Congressional intent for § 271(f) to have extraterritorial effects,
weighs heavily in favor of Judge Rader’s interpretation. 176 By interpreting
§ 271(f) in a technology-neutral manner, the Court will protect U.S.
standing in the international intellectual property stage and leave AT&T
with exactly the same remedies it had for redress before it brought suit:
foreign patent protection. 177 If AT&T wants to protect its foreign markets
from competitors, it must accord with the laws of those countries to obtain
patents on its technology. However, in markets where patent protection for
software is unavailable, AT&T must abide by the law and policy choices of
those sovereign nations and not look to U.S. patent law to obtain
protection. 178

CONCLUSION
¶34
The facts in AT&T v. Microsoft illustrate the challenges that
technological advancements pose on the territoriality of U.S. patent law.
Supreme Court precedent, however, dictates that the presumption against
extraterritorial application of U.S. law should govern this issue. The
presumption restrains U.S. law in accordance with the principles of comity
and national treatment so as to avoid conflicts between the laws of the
175

See id. at 1372, 1376. This interpretation is consistent with the Federal
Circuit’s decisions in both Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems Corp., 245 F.3d
1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001), and Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d
1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2004), as there is no intent that master copies of the
software shipped abroad be combined with foreign computers to create
infringing devices; only the foreign-made copies of the software, which are not
supplied from the United States, will be combined.
176
See AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1376 (Rader, J., dissenting).
177
See id. (discussing how the majority’s decision expanded the remedies
available to patent holders to include liability for acts conducted abroad).
178
See F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 166 (2004)
(“Why is it reasonable to apply [U.S.] law to conduct that is significantly foreign
insofar as that conduct causes independent foreign harm and that foreign harm
alone gives rise to the plaintiff's claim? We can find no good answer to the
question.”); see also supra Parts III.A–B (discussing the principles of comity
and national treatment and the separation of powers doctrine with respect to the
presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. patent law).
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United States and those of other sovereign nations. In AT&T v. Microsoft,
the Federal Circuit failed to heed the Supreme Court’s application of this
presumption in Deepsouth Packing and instead chose to interpret § 271(f) in
a technology-dependent manner that encompassed copies of software code
made abroad from U.S.-supplied master copies. This interpretation
broadens the scope of § 271(f) extraterritorially such that protection of
software inventions from patent infringement can now be obtained under
U.S. law irrespective of the jurisdiction in which the infringement occurs.
Not only does the imposition of U.S. law into foreign jurisdictions upset the
established international scheme of intellectual property rights and risk
damaging the United States’ foreign relations, but the expansive liability
under § 271(f) that now attaches to certain activities in software and other
industries also threatens to diminish innovation and productivity within the
United States.
¶35
In reviewing AT&T v. Microsoft, it is likely that the Supreme Court
will decide that software can be a component of a patented invention for the
purposes of § 271(f), and thus will face the issue of how to interpret the
term “supplies.” In assessing this issue, the Court should look to its case
law regarding the presumption against extraterritoriality. Because
Congressional intent regarding the applicability of § 271(f) to activities that
occur outside the United States is unclear, the Court should interpret
§ 271(f) in a manner that avoids extraterritorial effects: § 271(f) should be
interpreted in a technology-neutral manner and should be applied only to
conduct that occurs within the United States.

